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A RATIONAL BASIS FOR AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION: A SHAKY BUT CLASSICAL 
LIBERAL DEFENSE 
Richard A. Epstein* 
I am honored to participate in a symposium on the occasion of the 
lOOth anniversary of one of America's preeminent law reviews. I am 
saddened, however, to write, at what should be a moment of celebra­
tion, with the knowledge that both the Law School and the College of 
Literature, Science and the Arts are enmeshed in extensive litigation 
over the critical and explosive issue of affirmative action. 
To find striking evidence of the deep split of learned judicial views 
on this issue, it is necessary to look no further than the sequence of 
opinions in Gratz v. Bollinger1 and Grutter v. Bollinger. 2 Gratz was 
bought by a rejected white applicant to the College of Literature, 
Science and the Arts; Grutter by a rejected white applicant from the 
Law School. The two district courts reached opposite conclusions on 
what they perceived to be the central issue in this running dialogue: 
did the racial diversity of the student body count as a compelling state 
interest that justified a departure from the color blind norm estab­
lished under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment? Diversity, at the district court level, counted as a com­
pelling state interest for the University of Michigan College of 
Literature, Science and the Arts, but not for its Law School. This divi­
sion of opinion was erased when Grutter was reversed on appeal, most 
fittingly, by a bare five to four majority.3 No one seriously thinks that 
the matter will rest here, for the tensions within the Sixth Circuit and 
beyond make it likely that at long last the Supreme Court will revisit 
this issue. 
But what approach should be adopted to respond to this question? 
It is generally assumed that the legal answer lies in parsing the deci-
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago; 
Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. A.B. 1964, Columbia; 
B.A. (Juris) 1966, Oxford; LL.B. 1968, Yale. - Ed. 
1. 122 F. Supp.2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
2. 137 F. Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. May 14, 2002). 
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). The case was marked by a sharp 
procedural dispute over the propriety of the en bane decision. For the attack on the proce­
dure, see Grutter, 288 F.3d at 810-14 (Boggs, J., dissenting), responded to in Grutter, 288 F.3d 
at 752-58 (Moore, J., concurring) and Grutter, 288 F.3d 772-73 (Clay, J., concurring). I take 
no position on this dispute. 
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sions of two key Supreme Court precedents: Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke4 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 5 Divining 
these precedents offers ample grist for the legal mill, but is no part of 
my self-appointed task. Rather, I propose to outline in some detail the 
approach that I would take to these questions on the assumption that 
the only tools in the toolbox were the bare Constitutional text and a 
general appreciation of the Constitution as a classical liberal docu­
ment, that is, that emphasizes limited government, strong protection 
of property rights and contractual freedoms, coupled with prohibitions 
against force and fraud on the one hand, and monopoly power on the 
other.6 
Many people would assume, wrongly, that this systematic view of 
the Constitution leads to an invalidation of all affirmative action pro­
grams. But I believe that the sounder implications run in the opposite 
direction. Within this framework, I believe that both district courts 
and the Sixth Circuit went off the rails when in common they held that 
the right question only asks how to apply the strict scrutiny test to the 
Michigan affirmative action program. I believe that this is the wrong 
standard of judicial review, one which should be abandoned in favor 
of a more flexible standard that measures the constitutionality of the 
Michigan program by comparing it with the practices done by private, 
competitive institutions on a voluntary basis. Using that standard, my 
ultimate conclusion is that the University of Michigan, acting on its 
own initiative (a qualification that matters), is within its rights under 
the Constitution to establish an affirmative action program, however 
wise or foolish its decision. 
To many individuals that position seems out of character with my 
reputation for being "conservative" on various issues of social policy. 
But the label "conservative" often elides differences between social 
conservatives on the one hand7 and individuals like myself that work 
within the classical liberal tradition. Within that tradition, I shall out­
line. the set of beliefs that leads me to this conclusion. The path will, 
however, both zig and zag. My first order of business is to indicate why 
the claims for affirmative action fail under the current law so long as it 
requires the state to produce some form of compelling state interest 
test to justify affirmative action programs. My second order of busi­
ness is to explain how I think that the law should be restructured so as 
to permit the use of affirmative action programs in public universities. 
4. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
5. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
6. So defended in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
7. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN 
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996). 
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Compelling State Interest 
The common theme in all the opinions in Grutter and Gratz is that 
the University of Michigan must show a compelling state interest in 
order to maintain its affirmative action policies against challenges un­
der the equal protection clause. As was stated in Adarand, "all racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local govern­
mental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru­
tiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they 
are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental 
interests."8 In its decision, the majority of the Sixth Circuit added this 
gloss to the Adarand test: 
[I]n applying strict scrutiny, we cannot ignore the educational judgment 
and expertise of the Law School's faculty and admissions personnel re­
garding the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives. We are ill-equipped to 
ascertain which race-neutral alternatives merit which degree of consid­
eration or which alternatives will allow an institution such as the Law 
School to assemble both a highly qualified and richly diverse academic 
class.9 
That clarion-call for deference does not square well with the tradi­
tional conception of strict scrutiny. But the majority of the Sixth 
Circuit undoubtedly added that gloss because it could not unilaterally 
overturn the strict scrutiny standard in Adarand. In one sense, that 
tactical judgment was surely correct, for no matter what one thinks of 
the desirability of affirmative action programs, one conclusion seems 
clear. Under its traditional rendering, the strict scrutiny standard 
dooms the race-sensitive programs of the University of Michigan. 
The first point is that the University of Michigan does, for better or 
worse, take race into account in an explicit fashion in making its ad­
missions decisions. The statistical evidence of racial preferences of­
fered by the plaintiff's expert, Dr. Kinley Larntz, in Grutter centered 
on the "relative odds of acceptance" for members of each racial group. 
The technique is simplicity itself. All that is needed is to divide the ap­
plicants of all races into various cells, measured by their common 
grades and board scores. One then compares the probabilities of ad­
mission for members of the different groups. These differences are too 
large and too persistent to be obtained by chance. Judge Friedman 
found, for example, that "[i]n 1995, the relative odds of acceptance 
were 61.37 for Native Americans, 257.93 for African Americans, 81.90 
for Mexican Americans, and 37.86 for Puerto Ricans."10 Judge 
8. 515 U.S. at 227. 
9. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 750-51. 
10. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d at 837 n.20. 
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Friedman rightly dispatched the statistical evidence that Dr. Gerald 
Raudenbush offered for the University of Michigan in short order.11 
The Michigan programs (like those of virtually every other public 
university) thus deviate from the prima facie color-blind constitutional 
norm. The only question left to argue is that of justification. On this 
score, conventional wisdom rightly divides the purported justifications 
into two classes. The first of these holds that race sensitive programs 
can be used to provide remedies to particular and identifiable indi­
viduals who had been victims of discrimination wrought by the defen­
dant institution at some earlier time. The clear effort here is to appeal 
to some implicit notion of Aristotelian corrective justice under which 
the individuals to whom the relief is extended are the same persons 
who were wronged by the system in the first place.12 
That rationale, however, has a built-in time fuse that makes it a 
wasting asset in equal protection (or other race-based constitutional) 
litigation. The last use of official discrimination in the United States 
ended thirty-eight years ago; the vestiges of that discrimination may 
well have lingered on a bit longer. But these remedial claims by defini­
tion get weaker with each passing year even in those states that prac­
ticed some form of racial segregation or exclusion.13 But Michigan was 
not one of those places, and no amount of self-slander could make it 
so. Unless the University of Michigan can wrap itself in past sins that it 
did not commit, this backward looking rationale is dead on arrival. 
There is no need to discuss it further. 
The forward looking rational takes a different tack: diversity.14 The 
argument in a word is that the educational experience is better for all 
concerned if students are exposed to students who are drawn from all 
walks of life. It is just this line of argument that the University ad­
vanced with unitary passion on its behalf.15 According to its expert 
witness, Dr. Pamela Gurin, an educational program that has few, if 
any, black or other minority students in it offers a weaker education 
for the white as well as the other minority students in the program.16 
Diversity is not tied to past sins, so it is not a wasting asset. But for 
11. Id. at 839. 
12. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETH ICS, Book V, 113lb-25 et seq. (H. 
Rackham trans., Harvard University Press reprint ed. 1982). 
13. For my views on this in connection with litigation on local school districts, see 
Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirmative Action, Or School Desegregation in 
Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1101 (1996), discussing Missouri v. Jenkins, 510 U.S. 
70 (1995). 
14. For discussion, see, for example, Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1986 
Term - Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 78 (1986). 
15. Grutter, 137 F. Supp.2d. at 825-36; Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp.2d 811, 822 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000). 
16. Gratz, 122 F. Supp.2d. at 822-23. 
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some purposes diversity is a trope that may sweep too broadly, for it 
allows, indeed requires, the accommodation of all minority groups, not 
just blacks who have nationwide suffered the stain of slavery and past 
discrimination. But even if it is restricted to blacks only, and even if 
the social science is treated as solid, the evidence presented does not 
come close to being the required compelling state interest, at least un­
der any neutral standard that treats discrimination against whites with 
the same earnest apprehension as it does discrimination against 
blacks. By way of comparison, think of how difficult it is today under 
Title VII for any employer to show that he has a bona fide interest in 
discriminating on the grounds of sex or national origin.17 The statute 
did not even consider the possibility that such a justification could be 
offered on reasons of race.18 The original legislative history to Title 
VII may have provided that it is permissible for French restaurants to 
hire French chefs,19 but the case law under Title VII has been un­
relenting insofar as it has required a strict proof of business necessity 
to sustain any explicit sex classification.20 It is difficult, for example, to 
argue that states should have only female guards in female prisons.21 
The argument is that differences in sex are not to be tolerated unless 
the heavens will fall. 
Racial classifications are, if anything, more difficult to justify. Title 
VII hints at that difference because it contains no bona fide occupa­
tional qualification ("BFOQ") for race. Here, moreover, the heavens 
will not fall even if every program of race-based preferences were re­
pealed tomorrow. Start with the most obvious point: Students of mi­
nority groups may be forceful and eloquent spokesmen for their own 
racial views. But so what? There are many academic courses in which 
the questions of race and sex are marginal at best. In the arts and sci­
ences, none of the math and science curriculum has a racial message; 
the same is true of large portions of social sciences and the humanities 
as well. Within the law school, tax, business, and procedural courses 
have little if any content related to race, and it would be odd to say 
that they could not be taught successfully without any reference to 
race, or indeed without any minority or female students. After all, 
17. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e), codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (allow­
ing bona fide occupational qualifications for religion, sex and national origin). For my views, 
see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 283-312 (1992) (hereinafter EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS). 
18. Id. (race not on list). 
19. As stated in the Clark-Case memorandum in support of the Civil Rights Act. 110 
CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). 
20. See, e.g., Int'! Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
21. See, e.g., Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 838 F.2d 944 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (rejecting practice), overturned en bane, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (reversing 
decision below). 
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many of the lawyers and professors who teach today received excel­
lent education in these subjects before the advent of any affirmative 
action program. 
Of course other courses have greater racial content. Colleges of 
Arts and Sciences do teach extensive programs in Black Studies, and 
much of the humanities and social science curriculum does revolve 
around the issue of race. Similarly in law school, many courses, such as 
criminal procedure, civil rights, constitutional law, and employment 
discrimination positively invite some distinctive racial point of view. 
But once again, where is the compelling state interest? It would be 
odd to think that minority outlooks represent some monolithic front 
organized by race. We should expect a divergence of opinion both 
within and across racial groups. The members of a particular racial 
group never hold a de facto monopoly on any matter of public debate. 
It is, to say the least, highly improbable that all the white students in a 
large class are so ignorant of race relations that they are unable to 
comprehend the worries and aspirations of minority group members. 
Indeed, to insist that they cannot express this point of view suggests 
ominously that they cannot internalize that point of view either, even 
when from members of minority groups. But if that is the case, then 
diversity can hardly count as a compelling state interest if it consis­
tently fails to teach white students enough so that they can impart 
what they learn to others. 
Fortunately, this observation is wishful thinking. In the pre-1964 
era, the entire civil rights movement succeeded only because large 
numbers of white people, many of whom were raised in segregated 
circumstances, backed the movement with their hearts and souls, and 
in some cases their lives. Although not minority members, these 
people can relate their own experiences, and even if they cannot, it is 
easy to assign readings, or invite guest lecturers to express the black 
point of view. I do not claim that the use of any of these approaches 
works as well as a program that has a minimum minority representa­
tion in each class. But it is wholly unnecessary at this point to under­
take that battle. The question here is not whether education works 
better with diversity, on which people can, of course, disagree. It is 
whether the state has a compelling interest in that direction. A com­
pelling state interest is one that says we should rely on racial classifica­
tions to prevent race riots. No way, at least not under any two-way, 
color-blind standard articulated in Adarand. 
The color-blind standard, if conscientiously applied, cuts even 
deeper. One effort to deal with the demands for affirmative action af­
ter the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. State of Texas,22 which 
struck down the affirmative action program in Texas universities, is 
22. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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illustrative. In order to maintain black enrollment in Texas universi­
ties, Texas adopted a system whereby automatic admission was guar­
anteed on a color-blind basis to the top ten percent of each graduating 
class of each Texas high school. The program was color-blind in form, 
but its explicit intention was to maintain the levels of enrollments of 
minority students. The program was, in Glenn Loury's terms, color­
blind but not color indifferent.23 The point here is to avoid the visible 
sting associated with explicit racial categories while obtaining as much 
of the preferred race-distribution as possible, given that the top ten 
percent of an all-black high school for example has to be by definition 
black, no matter what the qualifications of the students in that top 
decile. 
There are forceful objections to the use of this race-blind (but not 
race indifferent) system as a matter of policy. Oftentimes black stu­
dents with lower class standing from rigorous urban schools have su­
perior academic credentials to black students who graduate at the top 
of smaller and less rigorous high schools. In principle, a sensible af­
firmative action program should take the strongest African-American 
students, a result that can only be achieved by the use of race­
conscious standards. Texas's new practice just illustrates the old 
maxim of Karl Llewellyn that covert tools are bad tools. But for these 
purposes, pass those difficulties by, for this formal system of race­
neutrality has to count as an open-and-shut evasion of a strict scrutiny 
test, precisely because of its hidden racial agenda. The civil rights laws 
knew of the dangers of neutral laws with disparate impact. The old 
grandfather laws were efforts to stymie black participation in the po­
litical process by denying the vote to anyone whose grandfather was 
not eligible to vote in, of course, the antebellum South. If one point 
was made repeatedly clear in the framing of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, it was that the federal statute would offer but a puny barricade 
to racial discrimination if it only attacked explicit racial classifications 
while enforcing neutral classifications adopted with the specific motive 
of keeping blacks out of certain positions.24 Indeed, even the use of 
motive-based tests was adjudged insufficient for that purpose, so that 
by 1971 the United States Supreme Court held that any employment 
practice done without racial motive could be attacked under Title VII 
so long as it had a disparate impact, unless that result could be justi­
fied by some narrow conception of business necessity.25 
The ten percent rule is, of course, adopted with the explicit racial 
motive of maximizing black enrollments at the university level. If 
23. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 133 (2002). 
24. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (setting out the 
various disparate treatment tests to smoke out cases in which neutral language was a pretext 
for discriminatory outcomes). 
25. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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Adarand means what it says in holding that strict scrutiny applies both 
ways, then this program that rejects racial indifference should be con­
demned as vigorously as a literacy test or a grandfather clause that is 
designed to keep black voters from the polls. Under strict scrutiny, fa­
cially neutral statutes and programs fall instantly to equal protection 
challenges when they are motivated by an explicit desire to favor 
whites over blacks. There is some dubious authority that extends the 
prohibition even to statutes whose intention is to restore or validate 
the common law rules that allow all property owners (common carri­
ers excepted) to decide whom to deal with and whom not.26 We cannot 
just forget these doctrinal byways if we believe in strict scrutiny for all 
race-based challenges. Let the games be played under the current con­
stitutional rules, and affirmative action is history. 
This view should come as no surprise to anyone who has glanced at 
the interpretive history of the clause. We can find only one case that 
sustained government action under this framework, Korematsu v. 
United States,27 which upheld the Japanese internment during World 
War II, even after all risk of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast 
had long passed. Surely that case offers cold comfort for the defenders 
of affirmative action: indeed government victories serve to remind us 
that strict scrutiny really does have some irreducible place in any 
sound analysis of equal protection. But for these purposes Korematsu 
is the dubious exception, not the general rule. Before the recent round 
of affirmative action cases .• the Supreme Court adhered to the famous 
formulation of Professor Gerald Gunther who observed that this stan­
dard was "strict" in theory, but "fatal" in fact.28 Fairly apply strict scru­
tiny and Michigan's affirmative action program is as dead as a door­
nail . True, but wholly unacceptable. We have to begin afresh. 
Rethinking the Constitutional Standard: Symmetry? 
The only question worth asking is, in my view, how to dislodge this 
strict scrutiny test in these affirmative action battles, without neces­
sarily jettisoning it in any and all contexts to which it might apply. In 
order to do that we have to recall how and why the test developed in 
the first place. As a matter of doctrinal convention, the strict scrutiny 
test lies at the opposite pole from the badly misnamed "rational basis" 
test, under which the level of deference accorded to the legislature is 
26. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
28. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
8 (1972). 
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so vast that any bad argument asserted with a straight face prevails.29 
One might say that the test is "rational" in theory and "permissive" in 
fact. No legal system, of course, could operate only at these two ex­
tremes, so a test of intermediate scrutiny has insinuated its way into 
the mix in equal protection law, as elsewhere. Our Constitution has an 
embarrassment of riches: a standard of review for every pocketbook 
and taste. 
Focusing for the moment at the extremes, what accounts for the 
spread of judicial sentiment to multiple challenges under the same 
clause? What factors could prompt the Supreme Court to take such a 
radically different attitude to different forms of legislation under the 
same constitutional provision? Obviously, no simple textual answer 
will explain the migration to two extremes simultaneously. Some 
structural or functional explanation has to be added to the mix. That 
explanation has both a procedural, or at least process-based, and a 
substantive component. Thus the first key variable is the level of trust 
that the Court perceives as appropriate for the political branches of 
government in any given context. The second variable is whether the 
Court is able to form its own considered view of whether the laws in 
question make sense on substantive grounds. 
The rational basis test is used when that level of trust is high, and 
the Court has no strong conviction one way or the other on the sub­
stantive merits of the laws before them. It is unfortunate that the 
Supreme Court overlearned from the "mistake" of Lochner v. New 
York30 in holding that virtually all general legislation directed to eco­
nomic affairs lies outside the scope of judicial review, not only under 
the equal protection clause, but just about everywhere else as well. 
Whether the issue was substantive due process or takings, or even 
matters relating to the scope of the commerce clause, the Court gravi­
tated toward the rational basis test because it held, and still holds, the 
perception that the political branches of government, both state and 
federal, can effectively deal with the economic issues that challenge 
the nation. It has no strong views as to what counts as sound economic 
policy. In an earlier age, such questions as the choice between monop­
oly and competition had merited judicial intervention in favor of the 
later.31 The welter of New Deal experiments championed monopolies 
in some cases (as agricultural policy, such as that sustained in United 
29. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ry. Express Agency v. New 
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding restrictions on advertising under due process). 
30. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
31. See, for example, the cases striking down wage and price regulations in those indus­
tries not "affected with the public interest." See, e.g., Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. 
Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (effectively overruled in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 
(1934) (sustaining minimum prices for milk)); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 
81 (1921 ). 
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States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.32 and Wickard v. Filburn33) and com­
petition in others (as with vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws), 
except of course against state sponsored cartels.34 In principle, national 
legislation veered strongly for and strongly against competition simul­
taneously. Only the legislature could sort through the confusion after 
all the relevant interest groups had participated in the legislative proc­
ess, where they could protect themselves against various forms of po­
litical risk.35 The standard of rational basis review was thus borne of 
two parallel considerations. First, the Court no longer had any sub­
stantive view of what counts as good legislation on economic matters. 
Second, the Court thought that an open political system gave the vari­
ous actors all the process protection needed to avert unacceptable 
outcomes. The revolution of 1937 cemented this synthesis into place. 
Yet this happy state of affairs was not to last. Just as the Court 
went into rapid retreat on economic issues, questions of race surged to 
the fore. In these cases, both the assumptions propping up the rational 
basis test collapse, and the famous footnote 4 in the Carotene Products 
decision immediately reinstituted a higher standard of review in favor 
of discrete and insular minorities,36 a code phrase, which at a minimum 
included black citizens in the South. Any claim that all relevant parties 
could protect their interests through the political process was patently 
false for a disenfranchised black minority. So overcoming its shaky 
start with the first white primary cases,37 the Court's basic attitude 
quickly shifted to using strict scrutiny to test legislation on matters of 
race. The Court did not have to engage in complex economic calcula­
tions to determine the evils of segregation and Jim Crow. It also rec­
ognized that the political process was rigged to frustrate the redress of 
individual and group grievances. Those perceptions thus drove the 
Court to demand the most compelling justifications of any restriction 
on individual liberties based on race. As with the rational basis test, 
the overall attitude spoke volumes. The peculiar features of each spe­
cific constitutional clause counted for relatively little. Tough scrutiny 
with race cases was rightly the order of the day. 
One of the great ironies with the modern statement of strict scru­
tiny is that it erects a color-blind norm that runs in both directions, 
such that under its relentless Adarand formulation any claim brought 
32. 315 U.S. 110 (1942). 
33. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
34. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
35. See Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1669 (1975). 
36. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938). 
37. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (invalidating white primary); 
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (sustaining white primary). 
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by a white person against state action should be judged by the same 
exacting standards as any claim brought by a black person against 
state action. Clearly, there has been an enormous shift in political in­
stitutions and political behavior since the end of the Second World 
War, indeed, even since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
But with all the advances in the protection of minority interests, with 
all the trumpeting of a new generation of explicit racial preferences, 
no one could say, or at least say honestly, that whites today are ex­
cluded from the political process as blacks had been under segrega­
tion; nor, in light of an oft-painful racial history, is it possible to sub­
ject raced-based polices that benefit blacks to the same full-throated 
denunciation as could be brought against state-sponsored segregation. 
To be sure, some people do believe that the color-blind principle op­
erates as a categorical imperative good for all ages. They can insist 
that the principle that first reared its head in Justice Harlan's classic 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,38 showed its value in the war against seg­
regation, and could do every bit as much good in rooting out affirma­
tive action programs. But such fervor is sadly misplaced: the simple 
truth is that the division of learned and responsible opinion makes it 
impossible to denounce affirmative action as the second-coming of Jim 
Crow. It is always open, in a popular if not a constitutional sense, to 
argue that affirmative action should be a response to the prior evils of 
segregation. It is hard to find some prior historical practice that could 
be invoked as the justification for Jim Crow segregation. 
Toward Rational Basis Review 
We thus arrive at an unhappy impasse. If we hew to traditional 
constitutional law doctrine, then we must jettison affirmative action 
notwithstanding its widespread support in the university and business 
communities.39 Their political position does not represent solely some 
high sense of social purpose. It also represents a strong instinct for in­
stitutional survival. The disparate impact tests used under Griggs re­
present that extravagant overextension of Title VII, which itself 
should be repealed. Businesses know that it is possible to live with 
Griggs, albeit not cheaply, solely because there is so little private insti-
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
39. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.2d 811, 822 n.11 (E.D. Mich. 2000). See also the 
corporations: General Motors, Abbott Laboratories, Bank One Corp., E.I. Dupont de Ne­
mours Co., Dow Chemical Co., Eastman Kodak Col., General Mills, Inc. Intel Corp., John­
son and Johnson, Kellogg Co., KMPG Int'!, Lucent Technologies, Inc. Microsoft Corp., PPG 
Industries, Inc., Procter and Gamble Co., Sara Lee, Crop., Texaco, Inc., TRW, Inc. Id. at 
813. See also, the ExxonMobil advertisement in the New York Times, March 7, 2002, at A31, 
"Laborious indeed at the first ascent," whose insert proclaims "Business support for women 
and minorities is growing." The ad is one of a series that proclaims all the race and sex-based 
programs that business supports, and praises per se violations of the color-blind, sex-blind 
standards of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
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tutional sentiment in favor of reverse discrimination in the first place. 
But the systematic extension of Griggs under a rigorous both-ways 
standard not only means the end of every affirmative action program 
in the private sector, but also a ceaseless round of suits any time the 
composition of the workforce deviates from Griggs's insanely tight re­
quirements of proportionate representation. Businesses and universi­
ties have little patience with the aesthetic niceties of perfect symmetry 
under a high standard. What they crave is freedom to enact the poli­
cies that they care about, and toward that end they get far more run­
ning room in a world in which Griggs becomes a one-way test and 
courts acquiesce in most if not all affirmative action practices. 
The same political calculations carry over to the equal protection 
clause. What is desired by these businesses and universities under the 
equal protection clause is the same partial dispensation from the legal 
straightjacket. Strong norms that ban racial discrimination against 
blacks are acceptable in principle, but the both-ways test is every bit as 
suicidal for American public institutions as the both-ways tests under 
Griggs are for private firms and universities. Clearly, something is very 
odd about judicial intrusion into the oversight of affirmative action, 
for no one believes, on or off the courts, that the factual predicates 
that justified strict scrutiny for legislation directed against disadvan­
taged black citizens applies with equal force to legislation in favor of 
disadvantaged black citizens. We do not have disenfranchised white 
voters; we do not have white-only fountains, nor racial policies that 
stink at the nostrils. 
Back to First Principles, Briefly 
The question then is, how we can translate that simple insight 
about social differences, grasped by every administrator public and 
private, into sensible constitutional doctrine? I think that we should 
take our cue from the judgment and practices of our private institu­
tions, most of which are committed to some level (but not necessarily 
the same level) of affirmative action in their daily operations. The ar­
gument requires us to attack some powerful mainstays of the modern 
civil rights movement, but since I have already sacrificed any and all 
claim to public office, I shall state the argument against the current 
status quo as best I can as a matter of first principle.40 
The discussion starts with the relationship of the individual to the 
state. That question resists a frontal assault by the tools of public law 
alone. Instead we must proceed by indirection. We must first develop 
40. For fuller statements of my position, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A 
FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD (1998), 
and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). I shall not 
document the details of the argument here. 
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a comprehensive theory that explains the relationship between ordi­
nary individuals. That theory then supplies us with the needed base­
line to understand the relationship between the individual and the 
state. How then do individuals relate to each other? In standard politi­
cal theory, the original position in the state of nature offers scant com­
fort. Before law, each may do what he pleases to any other person, 
who in turn is free to respond in the same way. Some writers in the 
Hobbesian tradition call this unbounded self as the exercise of a natu­
ral liberty, but other writers distinguish sharply between liberty and 
license, and reserve the term natural liberty to refer to conduct that 
does more than fear retaliation by others, but respects their individual 
rights. 
These ultimate descriptive differences about the state of nature are 
important for the history of ideas, but they should not conceal the es­
sential point. The utter absence of any legal order precludes any ar­
ticulated rights and duties that bind individuals to each other. Brute 
strength coupled with cunning determines how people interact with 
each other. The evident inconveniences of this social position have 
impressed themselves on all social contract theorists from Hobbes to 
Locke to Hume and Smith. Each writer in his own way concludes that 
the creation of a social order (or contract) requires all individuals to 
renounce the use of force (and fraud) against each other and the state 
to have enough power to make good the promises of the new legal 
order. Once that is done, then each is better off, for the security that 
he obtains is worth more than the liberties that he surrenders. Hence 
the first step of political theory is to postulate a series of universal 
rights whose correlative duties are to keep off. These duties benefit all 
and they bind all. They are imposed by law because of the manifest in­
ability to achieve them by unanimous contract. 
The next inquiry is whether we can conceptualize any further im­
provement in social arrangements from this new baseline. At least one 
move is easy to make. The renunciation of force allows people to keep 
what they have, but does not allow them to acquire anything through 
voluntary exchange: contracts, conveyances, gifts, mortgages, partner­
ships and the like are not part of the grand plan. But the introduction 
of a system of free exchange allows for gains from trade, which when 
applied systematically (that is over the full range of transactions) 
create vast improvements over the previous state of the world as well. 
Exchange is thus added to security. To that, we can add to the list of 
sensible state functions by allowing government to maintain the key 
network elements, such as roads and other network industries: again 
state power allows a social group to obtain output that cannot in prac­
tice be reached solely by voluntary combination. 
The system reads like a wish list at this point because it makes no 
financial provision for the collective enforcement of these rights, and 
thus apparently relies on allowing each person to use self-help in the 
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state of nature. The self-help system is so contaminated with bias and 
uncertainty that its drawbacks require little elaboration. Clearly, we 
can achieve an additional round of improvements by allowing for a 
system of (proportionate) taxation that supplies the funds to provide 
both the internal enforcement of these rights to liberty, property and 
contract, and protection against external enemies who might otherwise 
undermine the whole system.41 The implicit corollary is that all citizens 
have an equal right to participate in determining the way in which 
those funds were spent on these collective functions. In four easy steps 
we reach the core principles of limited government.42 
The question that one has to ask is what place does this system 
have for an antidiscrimination law that stipulates the grounds on 
which it is proper (or not proper) to do business with others.43 The 
answer is, I believe, that a nondiscrimination principle is a powerful 
antidote to the abuses of government and private power, where either 
is blessed with monopoly power over certain areas of human life. Such 
is the case when the state supplies protection to its citizens or essential 
services that cannot be obtained from other sources. The impartial 
administration of the rules of civil and criminal liability is indispens­
able protection for any system of ordered liberty. It is just for that rea­
son that the first Justice Harlan struck a powerful chord when he ap­
pealed to the color-blind principle as a means to equalize legal posi­
tion in the face of evident social equality.44 His object was to make 
41. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777 (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1937) ("The 
subjects of every state ought to contribute toward the support of the government, as nearly 
as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue 
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state."). 
42. On this point, Adam Smith is most instructive: 
According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend 
to: . . . .  first the duty of protecting the society from the violence an invasion of other inde­
pendent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting as far as possible every member of the so­
ciety from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing 
an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain 
public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any in­
dividual, or small number of individuals to erect and maintain. 
Id. at 651. 
That this position does not contemplate the regulation of labor markets is seen by 
Smith's earlier observation: 
Id. 
17. 
[T]he obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every 
man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own 
interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with 
those of any other man, or order of men. 
43. Again, for the fuller elaboration, see EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 
44. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting): 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, 
in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be 
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitu-
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sure that the state did not use its dominant power to advance the in­
terest of one group over another. We do a great disservice to his 
memory by overlooking that noble cause. 
Thus far I have noted the close analytical connection between the 
antidiscrimination norm and the presence of monopoly power. The 
former should be used as an effort to limit the state as well as private 
use of monopoly power. On this view, however, the antidiscrimination 
principle has no role to play to the extent that it is invoked to limit the 
ordinary principle of freedom of association as it applies to those pri­
vate individuals and firms that do not possess any monopoly power at 
all. We need to invoke the antidiscrimination principle against the 
monopolist to protect customers of essential facilities and services, 
such as the hub of a railroad network, who otherwise have no other 
place to go.45 But once any individual or institution is stripped of that 
monopoly power, then everyone else finds their strongest protection 
in the power to go elsewhere if they do not like the terms and condi­
tions on which any one provider chooses to offer some goods or serv­
ices. Free entry thus becomes the low-cost antidote to discrimination 
and abuse in competitive settings. 
This analysis has powerful implications for the use and reach of the 
color-blind principle. That principle which is used to prevent the crea­
tion of explicit political castes in a constitutional order should yield to 
the principle of freedom of association once the vestiges of monopoly 
power have been removed from the playing field. At this point we can 
see the great structural mistake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 insofar 
as it sought to regulate employment and educational opportunities. It 
demanded that the same color-blind principle that applies to the state 
in its role of the enforcer of private rights and the operator of social 
infrastructure be used to regulate the decisions of private actors in 
competitive markets. In so doing, it injected a new and gratuitous ele­
ment of monopoly power - the insistence that all private employment 
contracts abide by a single set of rules dictated by the state. When that 
statute was passed, most of its supporters made the confident empiri­
cal judgment that the consistent application of the nondiscrimination 
principle in employment and education would lead to an elimination 
of serious racial differences in the distribution of income and attain­
ment. For whatever reason, it turns out that they were wrong. It was 
only a matter of a short time until the dominant consensus shifted 
away from the two-sided nondiscrimination principle in favor of a rule 
that maintained the hard-edge against discrimination in one direction 
- against blacks and other racial minorities - while extolling the vir-
tional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country 
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is 
color-blind. 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
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tues of voluntary affirmative action in the other. In effect, one-half the 
Civil Rights Act was repealed by the artful construction given to Title 
VII, which allowed discrimination toward some but not toward others. 
The great error was that neither the courts nor the legislature were 
prepared to finish the job and to recognize that for ordinary private 
individuals and associations, the freedom of association principle 
should dominate the color-blind principle rightly invoked by Harlan in 
Plessy. The benefits of that principle can be quickly restated. The level 
of public coercion is minimized as individuals are allowed to form 
those contracts and associations that maximize their joint benefits. 
They have greater information about who they are and what they want 
than any legislature or any court, and thus can work out the elaborate 
personal and institutional arrangements that depend critically on the 
accumulation of that knowledge. Where the two parties do not agree, 
then the law provides both with a clear fallback position: each can 
refuse to deal with the other. Any two people who do form a mini­
association presumptively have it within their power to decide who 
else gets admitted into their group and who is excluded. The absolute 
refusal to deal is allowed, indeed encouraged, because other individu­
als and other groups can fill the social spaces left empty when one 
group, wisely or stubbornly, follows a policy of exclusion. 
So long as the critical ingredient of monopoly power is missing, it 
hardly matters what the grounds of inclusion and exclusion are. The 
chess club can exclude checkers players; it does not have to allow into 
membership anyone who plays board games. So it is that Jews and 
blacks and Christians and Muslims can all form their own groups, be it 
for religious, social or political purposes. One nice feature of this sys­
tem is that it allows for all individuals to assume overlapping identities 
by taking on multiple memberships. I can be the member of a Jewish­
only synagogue, a sports league open to men only, and an eating club 
open to all comers. The synagogue can invite non-Jews to participate 
in its athletic programs and after-school activities, but not in its relig­
ious instruction. The dense network of crossovers does not respond to 
any central plan, but emerges by successive interactions of ordinary 
people. In this milieu, the norm of freedom of association dominates 
because any effort to have the state decide the grounds on which 
people may not (or must) be admitted to organizations enlarges the 
very risk of monopoly power that makes government action so peril­
ous in the first place. 
This principle is, moreover, wholly consistent with the constitu­
tional ideal of equal protection of the laws, because it does not work 
differentially to the advantage of any one racial or religious group. 
Thus a full-throated endorsement of this principle makes it impossible 
for any state to exclude those groups who want to admit everyone, re­
gardless of race, creed or religion, except members of the Ku Klux 
Klan. The entire course of segregation in the Old South, especially its 
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totalitarian excesses, would have been vastly different if segregationist 
governments had been prepared or required to extend full and equal 
legal protection to voluntary integrated organizations as they did to 
segregated ones. The change in local governance would have altered 
the patterns of entry and exit into the region. The arrival of new 
people would lead to further changes in political composition of the 
electorate, and in the long run to the transformation of its ordinary 
politics. These changes in turn would have led to a major amelioration 
of social tensions, even if some white southerners had adamantly 
sought to preserve in their private relations only the traditions of seg­
regation. One controversial conclusion from this position is that the 
antidiscrimination laws have been extended beyond their proper 
sphere when used to regulate the behavior of individuals and firms in 
private competitive markets. To my mind, they are (or at least should 
be) unconstitutional insofar as they are applied to private voluntary 
organizations. 
Affirmative Action, At Last 
This conclusion is well beyond our comfortable mainstream, and 
doubtless will offend many. Nonetheless, it offers the ray of hope in 
sustaining affirmative action and undoing the social mischief that I be­
lieve will surely follow if the University of Michigan and other public 
and private universities are forced by a dubious reading of the equal 
protection clause into the Procrustean Bed whereby none of them can 
adopt affirmative action programs. If my analysis is correct, then it ex­
plains why the correct interpretation of the color-blind norm prevents 
the use of official favoritism without, at the same time, touching mat­
ters of private associational choice. Today we do live in an age of iden­
tity politics. Indeed for much of our history we have had identity­
based social movements.46 It seems odd beyond all imagination to be­
lieve first in the durability and the legitimacy of these movements, 
only to turn around and conclude that their sole permissible political 
objective is to secure color-blind rules in circumstances when the ap­
plication of color-based rules work to their disadvantage. A far more 
respectful reading of that tradition is to reaffirm the private/public line 
and to argue that all groups, regardless of their composition, have 
equal rights under law, including enjoyment of the full rights of asso­
ciation - precisely because they enjoy the equal protection of the 
laws (and of course liberty of contract under the due process clause as 
well). 
46. For discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) 
(this issue). 
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Those rights of association, I repeat, are not only rights of exclu­
sion. They are also rights of inclusion. In the modern setting, we know 
how many individuals choose to exercise their rights. In one sense, the 
Supreme Court beat a hasty retreat from a badly overgeneralized 
color-blind norm when, in United Steelworks v. Weber,47 the Court al­
lowed private firms, unions and associations to engage in discrimina­
tion that favors African-Americans and other minority groups. How­
ever much one may question their wisdom, no one can deny the 
power, durability and direction of these associational choices. Can 
anyone name a single institution (other, perhaps, than once all black 
institutions) that announces a race-based policy against blacks? No. 
The quick but cynical reply says that this pattern can only be treated 
as a beneficent consequence of the Civil Rights Act that makes such 
discrimination illegal. My reaction is exactly the opposite. The moral 
case for affirmative action is weakened, not strengthened, by the pub­
lic prohibitions against private discrimination against blacks. That le­
gal barrier makes it all too easy for cynics to argue that the widespread 
support for affirmative action is simply a clever ploy to reduce the 
odds being held liable under the Civil Rights Act. 
Yet the truth is otherwise. I have no question that tomorrow's re­
peal of the Civil Rights Acts would not result in the end of affirmative 
action programs. The current practices cannot be explained as a clever 
strategy to escape liability. Were that the case, then private institu­
tions would edge as close of the line as they could without being 
caught. But the dominant reality is otherwise. The level of affirmative 
action in the United States in the private sector on grounds of race 
goes far beyond what is needed to keep firms out of hot water. It re­
presents a sustained and consistent effort to change the dominant 
practices in the United States. It is often said that narrow and atomis­
tic accounts of human nature fail to explain complex problems of so­
cial organization. Glenn Loury pushes hard on that point when he at­
tacks the traditional rights-based theories of contractual freedom 
associated with Robert Nozick.48 Yet at no point does he, or others 
like him, return to the original rhetoric in support of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, where the constant theme was that disembodied merit 
should be the exclusive criterion on which employment (and similar 
47. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
48. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), criticized in LOURY, 
supra note 23, at 128, 212 n.5 (2002). The gist of that criticism is that the theory does not ex­
plain what should be done when the transfer of resources in society does not follow the pre­
scribed rules, which in Nozick's case are the rules of original acquisition by capture followed 
by voluntary transfer thereafter - yet another variation on Smith's system of natural liberty. 
But no theory works well with restitution from admitted wrongs, especially those from sys­
temic social causes. For different views on this subject, see Orlando Patterson, Beyond 
Compassion, DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 26, and Richard A. Epstein, Against Redress, 
DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 39. 
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decisions) were made. As Hubert Humphrey stated: "In Title VII we 
seek to prevent discriminatory hiring practices. We seek to give people 
an opportunity to be hired on the basis of merit, and to release the 
tremendous talents of the American people, rather than to keep their 
talents buried under prejudice or discrimination."49 The statute thus 
did not appreciate the importance that the full range of personal char­
acteristics has for the effective operation of voluntary markets, and 
thus has created a caricature of hiring standards that dogs the opera­
tion of labor markets to this day. The civil rights establishment, so 
keenly attuned to the dangers of Jim Crow, was blind to the long-term 
effects of Title VII. Loury and others should direct their fire against 
the civil rights establishment and not the market libertarians, who 
avoid the mistake of limiting employment decisions behind some pub­
lic standard of merit.so 
It is not just black intellectuals and libertarians who get the point. 
Many white people hold the same views with passionate intensity. The 
level of affirmative action in the United States is not explainable by 
pressure from minority groups alone. They are too weak to do the job. 
White support for these programs is needed to explain the variegated 
responses to the use of affirmative action in the United States. 
This combination of past history and present practice gives us the 
vital clue as to the proper role of government with respect to the af­
firmative action challenge. The public/private distinction of classical 
liberal theory has become blurred because governments today do 
more than classical liberals like myself think appropriate. One of the 
things that states do, which probably they should not do, is run great 
universities. But here is not the place to argue for the privatization of 
state universities.s1 Nor is it any part of my agenda to invoke the color­
blind standard as a backhanded effort to induce state universities to 
privatize. Rather I shall undertake only the more limited task of de­
termining how the state should be judged when it steps beyond its tra­
ditional nightwatchman's role and undertakes the kinds of enterprises 
that are also taken by private institutions in competitive markets. Here 
we must inescapably make judgments about the operation of a second­
best world. Ultimately the question is one of resemblance. Do public 
universities and their kindred institutions look more like private insti­
tutions that supply the same sorts of educational services, or do they 
look more like the arms of the system of law enforcement? 
49. 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964). 
50. For my views, on the point, see Epstein, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 17, at 
163-65. 
51 .  Adam Smith may have been a bit harsh when he wrote: "Were there no public insti­
tutions for education, no system, no science would be taught for which there was not some 
demand; or which the circumstances of the times did not render it either necessary, or con­
venient, or at least fashionable, to learn." SMITH, supra note 41, at 733. 
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In my view, the answer to that question is clear: the private anal­
ogy wins, hands down. State universities receive some public funds, 
and are subject to too much direct legislative control. But they charge 
tuition for the students who they enroll, and they pay salaries to the 
faculty and administrators that they hire. In both settings they operate 
in intensely competitive markets, where the competition comes from a 
wide array of private institutions, from state institutions within the 
state, and from state institutions of other states. 
That context matters. No one to my knowledge thinks that a de­
mand for an affirmative action program is even intelligible when the 
state operates in its law enforcement capacity. No one claims that an 
affirmative action law should allow black individuals to escape on 
grounds of race punishment for actions that expose white individuals 
to charges of murder. No one thinks that the punishment to all blacks 
should be 1.2 or 0.8 times the same punishment for whites for the same 
offense under the same circumstances. Even if we think that race­
conscious decisions should be used in hiring and assigning members of 
the police force - and in many cases we do - the goal is always to se­
cure all individuals the equal protection of the laws, with the emphasis 
evenly distributed between "equal" and "protection." 
Yet matters take on a different aspect when we deal with the dis­
tribution of government benefits through state run firms in competi­
tive markets. We need in these cases a benchmark to decide what is 
and is not appropriate behavior. All too often the tendency in dealing 
with matters of race is to decry the use of private law analogies in set­
ting out the standards in these cases. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw has 
taken just that route when she argues that Lochner v. New York52 is 
cut from the same cloth as is Plessy and should therefore be de­
nounced for the same reasons we denounce Plessy.53 One obvious dif­
ference between the two cases should give pause to that conclusion. 
Plessy opted for a very broad definition of the police power, which al­
lowed for the separation of the races on the supposed grounds that it 
would advance the purpose of racial harmony. Lochner, for its part, 
hewed to a narrower definition of the police power to strike down a 
state that prevented certain classes of bakers from working more than 
ten hours per day on the ground that this ostensible safety statute was 
really little more than a disguised labor law (i.e . ,  an explicit anticom­
petitive statute). 
I cannot resist mentioning one obvious irony here. To the extent 
that Plessy could be read (in modern terminology) to adopt a rational 
basis standard for racial classification, every defender of affirmative 
action should devoutly wish that it were the authoritative decision in 
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
53. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Address at the Michigan Law Review Centennial 
Celebration (Feb. 16, 2002). 
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Gratz and Grutter. At this point the University of Michigan wins the 
case in a walk. But this line of argument seems perverse if read to le­
gitimate the actual legal outcomes in Plessy itself. 
The key to the puzzle lies in setting the context for both Plessy and 
Lochner. Both of these cases involved claims for state interference 
with private organizational preferences. In both cases the state over­
stepped its nightwatchman role, and in both cases its actions should 
have been struck down. Lochner was right, and Plessy was wrong. But 
our context is different. Here the state is acting as a market participant 
not as a regulator. We still have to worry about the illicit use of state 
power, but now we have a benchmark against which we can check its 
action. Quite simply, we take as the measure of the reasonableness of 
the state action the question of whether it follows the voluntary pat­
terns and choices made by the private institutions with which it com­
petes. Here, it is clear that no private institution will practice explicit 
racial discrimination against blacks. We therefore do not have to 
worry about the occasional ambiguity if some small but respectable 
fraction of private institutions did follow this practice. Quite simply, 
state institutions may be constrained to act within a narrower band of 
reasonableness than private institutions. But no matter how that ques­
tion is resolved, no state institution can adopt positions that are more 
extreme than those of the private benchmarks against which its be­
havior is judged. We do not have to embrace the alarmist position that 
the acceptance of affirmative action programs opens the door to tradi­
tional forms of race segregation in higher education. By the same to­
ken, (notwithstanding the presence of the Civil Rights legislation) we 
know that these organizations strongly endorse some practice of af­
firmative action. 
We may rest assured, moreover, that they reached these decisions 
after they heard each and every argument that could be raised in de­
fense of a color-blind principle in social life. These institutions are 
fully aware of the limitations of standardized tests, for they rely on 
them to choose applicants within separate cohorts. They understand 
the danger of stigma that comes from the use of affirmative action 
programs - and the danger of stigma that comes from their elimina­
tion. (Stigma is one of those ubiquitous if elusive vices that can be 
thrown up in the face of any social program, regardless of content or 
motive, that addresses the problems of race.) They are fully aware that 
it is more expensive to recruit and retain minority students in their 
ranks. They know that the acceptance of minority students will neces­
sarily displace white students with superior academic credentials. They 
have figured out that you cannot get sufficient minority representation 
into private and public universities by jiggering any set of race-neutral 
standards in ways that maximize black representation. They under­
stand that in some ways it is more difficult to teach classes in which 
students come with widely different levels of academic skills. They 
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know full well that remedial education for minority students (or in­
deed all underprivileged students) has only an uncertain success rate. 
They are aware that minority students finish on average lower in 
classes, take longer to finish their degrees, and have a higher drop out 
rate. They know that the aggressive recruitment of minority students 
means that across the board, they have lower academic achievement 
levels than their peers. 
These findings are not news. In many cases these objections have 
real bite. They may, and should, influence the resources devoted to af­
firmative action programs. They may supply pointers as to how these 
programs should be run; they may offer clues as to why some pro­
grams succeed while others flounder. But throughout it all, the vast 
bulk of private institutions of higher education in the United States 
remain steadfast in their use affirmative action programs. Their public 
competitors should have the same options available to them. 
In my view, this point is critical to assess the constitutionality of the 
overall system. I do not think that the Constitution should be read to 
allow the state to meet the minimal standards in traditional rational 
basis analysis in deciding on its racial practices. That lax standard 
would allow a state to reinstitute programs of discrimination against 
blacks even if no private organizations followed that pattern, contrary 
to the position I have taken above. Nor do I think that this position 
requires one to jettison Brown v. Board of Education54 in order to sal­
vage modern affirmative action programs. Those programs could not 
have survived in their traditional form if blacks had equal rights of 
participation in the political process and were not subjected to the rein 
of intimidation and terror, private and official, that characterized so 
much of organized segregation in the Old South. 
Yet none of those conditions apply today. Instead we can say with 
some confidence that this case should be governed by a constitutional 
variation of the business judgment rule. Members of boards of trus­
tees, university presidents, provosts, deans, faculty, and students have 
concluded through their internal deliberations that affirmative action 
programs are an essential ingredient to their overall programs. No one 
should override a private organization that takes that stand. Most leg­
islators don't have the foggiest idea of how private universities are 
run, and they should keep their hands out of the pie. In this regard, the 
passage of Proposition 20955 in California represents just the wrong 
approach because it seeks to impose a top-down, system-wide re­
sponse, which only exposes the dangers of state monopolies. The hos­
tile response from below shows just how unwise it was for the 
California voters to adopt this form of command-and-control activi-
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
55. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31 (adopted 1996). 
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ties. Decentralized decisions, with minimal legislative intrusion, are 
surely the order of the day. A similar vice, with similar drastic conse­
quences follows from the passage of Title IX, dealing with sex dis­
crimination in aid to higher education; its instant repeal is a good place 
to reform federal policies. What is true of legislators is true of judges 
and justices (even those who come from academic backgrounds). They 
could not run a university either, at least on the color-blind principles 
that they could impose under a misplaced reading of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The question that remains is how far am I prepared to go with the 
ideal of freedom of association. Thus one sensible challenge asks 
whether or not I would allow state educational institutions to adopt an 
explicit religious profile as say, a Baptist, Catholic or Jewish institu­
tion. There is no question that such a decision would be regarded to­
day as a per se violation of the Establishment Clause.56 Private univer­
sities can fill this particular void. Public universities need not. 
In my view sectarian public institutions of this sort shou
0
ld be re­
garded as out of bounds. The question is how to distinguish this case 
from that of affirmative action. Here I think that the best line of attack 
is to note the three major approaches towards religion: separation, ac­
commodation, and neutrality.57 None of these finds any place for state­
run religious institutions, but they differ strongly in the way in which 
they respond to religious activities in public universities. It is easy, too 
easy, for the strict separationist to hold that no state university should 
tolerate any religious activities on campus. That position strikes me as 
untenable precisely because private secular universities all make place 
for Christian, Jewish and Muslim organizations in their ranks, and re­
gard themselves as the stronger for it. I am hard pressed to see why 
public institutions have to be barren on matters of such evident impor­
tance, especially in an age of identity politics. All in is far better than 
all out. 
But all in on what terms? In most cases that will require simply 
neutrality, so that a university decision to fund nonreligious campus 
magazines, for example, means that the state must also fund religious 
magazines out of revenues drawn from all students.58 But this 
nondiscrimination approach does not necessarily require a principle of 
neutrality toward religion in all cases. Ever since the decision in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,59 
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
57. For discussion, see Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1; Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1961) (advocating strict neutrality), and Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separa­
tion and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997). 
58. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
59. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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which refused to make any accommodation for those who smoked 
peyote only for religious purposes, strict neutrality has rightly been 
under attack across the political spectrum.60 In this context, some ac­
commodation should be made, as it routinely is, for men who wear 
yarmulkes or women who for religious reasons will not shake hands 
with men (as on receipt of their degrees). The exact extent to which 
accommodation tempers a belief in neutrality is one of the hardest 
questions in the vexed law of religious liberty, but the details of that 
tradeoff need not bother us here. All that we need do is affirm the 
view that inclusion of all religious life on campus is part of the picture, 
while leaving it to a later day to work out the details on how it should 
be done. 
Stated otherwise, the current practices on religion within the uni­
versity seem to recognize the difference between the state in its role as 
nightwatchman and the state in its role as provider of goods and ser­
vices. There is no real demand for public institutions to adopt explicit 
religious postures. There is no need in a public university to tolerate 
the exclusion of members of other religious groups. The establishment 
clause has much more direct bite than the equal protection clause, and 
any justification for deviation from that principle seems quite weak 
given the wide range of faiths and religions from which public univer­
sities draw. Their varying needs can be met by sensible open access for 
all that makes, at the edges, appropriate accommodations for first this 
group, and then that one.61 The matter is not free from doubt of 
course. It is also possible to take the position that we should allow 
these religious campuses to develop under state auspices because the 
diffusion of political power is such that no one faith would get to run 
all such campuses. But I think that the risk of serious social dislocation 
is large enough relative to the dubious gains that are generated that 
we should leave well enough alone on this front. The rules on religious 
activities in public universities can stay more or less where they are. 
It is useful to sum up: public institutions of higher education are in 
close competition with private institutions of higher education. It sim­
ply defies imagination (to lapse into Scalia-like excesses)62 to think 
that they should be disabled from adopting and following the same 
strategies as their private competitors on affirmative action questions. 
60. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Free­
dom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to - 4 (1994)). I think that Boerne was correctly 
decided insofar as it affirmed the dominance of the Court over Congress in setting constitu­
tional standards. But that is only one reason why Smith should be overruled. 
61. Thus the believer in strict neutrality would allow a prohibition on all headgear if 
done for nonreligious reasons. But surely an accommodation that allowed religious headgear 
should be allowed in classes absent some clear showing as to why it is inappropriate. But 
these details do not influence the general point here. 
62. For typical examples, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 2008 (2002) (this issue). 
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For these purposes, they should be regarded as voluntary associations, 
and as such be protected against constitutional attack precisely be­
cause they are seeking to implement the principle of freedom of asso­
ciation within the public sphere. Think back to the tests for using the 
strict scrutiny in the first place. Here we have a powerful independent 
check, which explains why affirmative action programs are adopted. 
Private institutions of all sorts and stripes use them. The state universi­
ties that adopt them are not dominated by one narrow group. The po­
litical constellation of forces looks exactly like that which inspired 
(wrongly in my view) the rational basis test for the state regulation of 
private actors. The story on substance is much the same. 
Dialogue 
There is one question that remains. How will various universities 
seek to manage the question of affirmative action if and when the 
Supreme Court decides that it is best to allow business as usual to pro­
ceed without the cloud of constitutional invalidation? In my view, it 
should improve the situation. One great vice of the current debate is 
how it polarizes positions. There is no give whatsoever in the color­
blind position. Race has to be ignored in all ways and at all times. Any 
deviation from the principle becomes a mortal sin. But oddly enough, 
the situation is scarcely better if we switch to the other side and pro­
claim that the case for affirmative action is so compelling that it meets 
the strict scrutiny standard set up under the equal protection clause. 
Let that be the case, and how can any hardy soul argue against the 
principle in practice? Is it really tenable to take a public position to 
eliminate or even restrict a program that the Supreme Court has found 
to be a high social imperative? 
These two extreme positions create a battle of the titans. But un­
fortunately, they drag down everyone who hopes to adopt some mod­
erate position to the ever-momentous problems of race. But the social 
success in dealing with the race issue in America depends on our abil­
ity to defuse the passions that the topic so typically raises. No sensible 
administrator in a regulation-free world would ever wish to debate af­
firmative action in the grandiose terms that dominate public discourse. 
Rather, the only strategy that works is one that adopts some position 
more favorable to affirmative action than its staunchest opponents 
would allow, but less favorable to its invocation than its faithful sup­
porters demand. At every point, the grand debate is put into the back­
ground so that smaller issues can prevail. How do this year's numbers 
look relative to last year's? What is the relative strength of the differ­
ent groups in the pool? What is the public reputation of the school? 
What is the position of the alumni? How does the affirmative action 
program tie in or relate to other initiatives in the institution? At each 
juncture, the key is to make those incremental adjustments in the pro-
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gram in order to achieve what are in the end only incremental im­
provements. Affirmative action becomes a management priority: get 
through this year with good relations and trust, and then try to do a bit 
better next year. I can of course give no concrete advice to the 
University of Michigan on how it should configure its program -
unless asked. But I do have advice for those who are sure that they 
know how to run the venture from afar. Cool it on the big think. Small 
steps do best, in an environment that is free of constitutional impedi­
ments. 
